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1 Introduction
As micro-finance began to be overtly championed
for its antipoverty properties, and as donor and
government interest grew rapidly, the killjoys
emerged. Some sceptics refused to view micro-
finance as being all that different from the older,
much criticised approaches to finance for small
farmers (Adams and von Pischke 1992). It was
argued that micro-finance should be brought under
the same principles applied to the development of
other segments of financial sectors. Promotion of
micro-finance supposedly indicated that govern-
ments and donors were still insufficiently trusting
of market forces in the supply and demand of
financial services to the poor.
One area of strength in recent thinking, however,
lies in its convincing identification of weaknesses
in past approaches. Well-meaning policies were
often benignly unhelpful in serving the poor; often
they served the rich better. Interventionist policies
often generated economic rents, inefficiencies, and
financially unsustainable situations (e.g. pressure
on government budgets from bad debts in public-
sector credit programmes and public banks, losses
in private banks due to directed credit, financial
instability, etc.). In many countries financial devel-
opment has been severely repressed. For example,
financial deepening in sub-Saharan Africa in 1980
was the same as in East Asia 20 years earlier, as
indicated by estimates of M2IGDP (Cole and
Duesenberry 1994). Thus, there remains a strong
case for less meddling in financial sectors, espe-
cially to eliminate crude macro-economic instru-
ments like interest-rate ceilings.
The purpose of the article is to examine how the
poor might best be served when current
approaches to financial sector development are
applied to micro-finance. The article concludes
that in spite of predictions by financial liberalisa-
lion theory the poor are likely to remain under-
served by the financial markets.
An earlier version of this article was prepared for
Oxfam (UK) in 1996. My thanks to Marzia Fontana,
Arjan de Haan, Susan Johnson, Michael Lipton, Imran
Matin, Ben Rogaly and Saurabh Sinha for their ideas and
suggestions at different times.
The argument is organised as follows. The second
section describes some influential ideas within
micro-finance. It is less a description of consensus
and more an outline of the dominant strand.
The third section sketches the core elements of the
financial sector liberalisation theory on which much
of the leading ideas on micro-finance are predi-
cated. Studies of financial sector liberalisation expe-
riences reveal an inconsistent and confusing
picture. This muddy picture contrasts with the
overbearing confidence underlying the current
thinking on finance, as exemplified by Vogel and
Adams (1997). It is not clear whether the latter is
based on a systematic empirical evaluation of com-
peting plausible theories.
The fourth section highlights some shortcomings of
the liberalisation theory in terms of the main
process by which presumably it could help the
poor, namely greater market competition between
service providers. Based on this, the concluding
section argues that policymakers should resist a
shift in focus away from poverty elimination, even
if it means continued subsidisation of micro-finance.
2 Leading Ideas on Pro-Poor
Finance
Pro-market viewpoints very much influence current
thinking on finance for the poor. Financial liberali-
sation 'remains the only game in town' (McKinnon
1989: 53, quoted in Gibson and Tsakalotos 1994:
578). This view states that the determining of inter-
est rates and allocation of credit between sectors
and groups of people, should be left to market
forces. Governments should withdraw from direct
involvement in financial institutions and specialised
programmes should target financial services to spe-
cific groups. Sneaky taxation, such as excessive
reserve requirements, should be cancelled, along
with the financial sector subsidies that they pay for.
Public policy should concentrate on effective legal
and regulatory systems, and market competition
between service providers (Vittas 1991).
Liberalising financial markets would create an
'enabling environment' in which intermediaries
would opt to supply better financial services to the
poor. It is assumed that the poor will be able to
103
obtain the services they require within a market-
driven enabling environment. 'Competition forces
survivors to be innovative in producing attractive
financial products and services and also in lowering
transaction costs ... Self interest, rather than altru-
ism, dominates decisions.' (Vogel and Adams 1997:
375-76.)
For the most part, (unfettered) informal financial
markets are seen as the best place for the poor to
obtain financial services, and the fact that the poor
do in fact resort to such markets seems to justify
this view. Programmes with an explicit pro-poor
emphasis are conditionally tolerated. Within micro-
finance, therefore, the poor should no longer be
regarded as 'beneficiaries', but instead as 'micro-
capitalists' (von Pischke 1996: 229). The suppliers
of micro-finance should no longer be viewed as
poverty-oriented, but rather business-oriented. If
they are not subsidy-free, they should head towards
it (Yaron 1992). The bottom line is that micro-capi-
talists, even poor ones, should pay for the services
they receive to cover all costs at market rates. It is
anticipated that liberal financial markets would sup-
ply services to all types of people, including the poor.
Financial sustainability (or the promise of such) dis-
tinguishes programmes and institutions currently
identified as being successful in providing financial
services to the poor. In other words, to join the
ranks of the successful, a micro-finance programme
must be at least financially self-sustaining, with suc-
cess in other areas providing additional bonuses. So
the most exciting situation is when micro-finance
programmes relaunch themselves as formally estab-
lished banks, as has occurred in a handful of well
cited cases. So, while previous interventions in
financial markets, such as small-farmer credit,
might have had significant beneficial effects,2 the
argument is that those benefits could have been
achieved at a far less cost within a liberalised finan-
cial system.
3 Liberalisation: What is it Meant
to Do?
Rather than stimulating investment, cheap credit is
argued to have quite the opposite effect. Low
lending rates mean intermediaries have to set low
2 See for example Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig (1993), or Lipton and Toye (1990).
interest rates on deposits, and if the rate of inflation
exceeds the interest rate, deposit rates become neg-
ative in real terms. This depresses savings in finan-
cial instruments by lowering the financial return to
saving.3 The effect of lower savings will be to
depress the quantity of investment, and hence
growth. Financial sector liberalisation suggests that
intermediaries can set interest rates and raise the
quantity of investment, due to the consequent
increase in savings. The key assumption here is that
in developing countries total investment is con-
strained by the level of savings. Therefore, there is a
virtuous circle of greater savinginvestmentgrowth
(McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973; Gibson and
Tsakalotos 1994).
It is further argued that fixing interest rates
decreases the quality of investment. Applying a
conventional supplydemand framework, fixing
interest rates below the rate where the market clears
generates a demand for credit in excess of the sup-
ply of savings. With the cost of borrowing low (due
to low interest rates), the returns to projects pro-
posed for finance can also be lower. Unable to
ration credit by charging higher lending rates, inter-
mediaries tend to select a larger proportion of these
low return projects for financing, since lower pro-
ject returns also imply lower risk. Thus the quality
of investment is lowered. Directed credit (forcing
banks to lend to certain sectors, specialised credit
programmes, preferential terms to certain sectors)
also reduce investment quality and allocative effi-
ciency, because the financial sector is unable to allo-
cate resources to the most productive sectors.
Interest rate liberalisation, combined with the elim-
ination of sectoral quotas, would ensure that the
loan portfolio quality of banks would improve.
How might the poor fit into this kind of a model?
Positively, if the poor are able to access better finan-
cial savings instruments, which allow them to save
in small amounts, whilst ensuring them non-nega-
In fact the effect of a change in interest rates on
savings is much less clear in theory This is because two
countervailing tendencies may result. An increase in the
returns to savings raises the stream of future income
and wealth, and thus may reduce savings by raising
current consumption based on the greater wealth. At
the same time, the higher returns from higher interest
rates should encourage savings, because postponing
current consumption would imply larger future
consumption out of current income.
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tive real interest rates. This is especially so since
low-income groups tend to hold a larger proportion
of their assets as cash, and are therefore subject to
greater 'inflation tax'. Also positively, if the poor are
able to gain better access to credit. If savings
increase due to higher real interest rates, institu-
tions might innovate on their lending (because idle
funds cost money), and some of this innovation
might include lending to the poor. Furthermore, as
the market for capital begins to clear on the basis of
price, without the distortions of credit quotas,
financial institutions would be willing to lend to
projects which offer better returns, even if they are
riskier. So long as the poor wish to invest in such
projects, they would be financed.
Many econometric studies have tested this thesis.4
Review articles indicate that the empirical debate is
far from conclusive (Gibson and Tsakalotos 1994:
594). For example, while the model predicts that
savings are supposed to increase with real interest
rates, empirically some studies show the predicted
interest elasticity of savings, and others do not.
'Despite a hot debate, no convincing general evi-
dence either way has been produced which leads
one to the provisional view that the saving rate is
largely independent of the interest rate.' (Modigliani
1986: 304.) 'Decisions to save are determined by
several factors and the relationship between savings
and real interest rates is at best ambiguous.' (Cho &
Khatkhate 1990.) It is difficult to reconcile the con-
flicting evidence partly because of poor data.
Similarly inconsistent evidence is found for the
impact of savings on investment, and for the sup-
posed virtuous circle of growth (Gibson and
Tsakalotos 1994: 595-6). In conclusion, Gibson
and Tsakalotos point out that 'links between vari-
ables of interest remain obscure, ... equations are
misspecified, particularly with regard to omitted
variables, and thus the estimates presented are
unreliable for policy analysis ... Thus we have to
conclude here that the econometric evidence does
These include Gupta (1987), Giovannini (1983), Cho
& Khatkhate (1990), Nissanke (1990), Arneta (1988),
de Melo and Tybout (1985), Mwega et aI. (1988),
Oshikoya (1992), Aryeetey and Gockel (1991),
Lipumba et al. (1990), Nyong and Ekpenyong (1994),
and Fischer (1993), collectively covering a wide number
of Asian, African and Latin American countries. This is
only indicative, and by no means a comprehensive list.
not provide much help in finding for or against the
McKinnonShaw hypothesis tiiberalisation the-
oryl.' This view is consistent with several other
review papers (Hadjimichael 1995 et al.; King and
Levine 1993; Arrieta 1988).
4 Servicing the Poor
If empirical studies do not provide conclusive evi-
dence on financial liberalisation theory, they do at
least suggest the complex way in which financial
markets work in different countries. The main les-
son is a need for closer scrutiny of the micro-eco-
nomic foundations of much of the leading thinking
on finance, as it relates to the poor. Two areas are
especially relevant for understanding how liber-
alised financial markets react to the opportunities
offered by the poor. The first relates to the assump-
tion that liberal interest rates would be sufficient to
address some fundamental information difficulties
in financial markets which tend to ration the poor
out of formal markets. The second relates to the fact
that the poor source many financial services within
the informal market. Consideration of these two
areas, as discussed below, indicates an important
gap in financial markets increasingly being filled by
micro-finance, and which is unlikely to be filled
simply by market liberalisation.
The problem with the poor is that they bank in small
transactions, and often can be more costly to service,
for example because of rural residence. This means
that the cost of collecting information to assess risk is
high, especially in relation to the money to be made
on small loans. Though in practice interest rates may
be determined by a number of macro-economic fac-
tors (Moretti 1992), it is argued that liberalisation
allows intermediaries freedom to set interest rates to
cover extra costs. This would encourage formal
lenders to increase services to the poor. Thus interest
rates would rise to clear the market and, as long as
the poor were willing to pay the going rate, they
would not be rationed out of the market by any other
means. Indeed the literature now takes the view that
credit demand by the poor is quite inelastic to the
interest rate, and so the poor would be willing to pay
higher rates. This is in contrast to the previous
This is the experience in Malawi (Lindauer and
Roemer 1994), Gambia (Lindauer and Roemer 1994),
Bangladesh (World Bank 1995), Bolivia (Moretti 1992),
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assumption that the poor could only afford cheap
credit. Both, of course, may be true.
Exactly how far interest rates would need to rise
depends on a number of factors, such as the loca-
tion of the poor, infrastructure, population density,
etc., as these affect the costs of service provision. A
study of BRACs micro-finance programme in
Bangladesh estimates that a lending interest rate of
75 per cent would be required for subsidy elimina-
tion (Khandker and Khalily 1995: 58-69). lt is easy
to speculate that banks may require even higher
rates to reach the poor than an explicitly pro-poor
NGO such as BRAC, especially since much of the
formal financial sector remains inexperienced in
serving the poor. However, lenders may be reluc-
tant to raise interest rates too high. Overly high
interest rates may be perceived to increase project
failures (by increasing the burden on borrowers),
drive out good projects (adverse incentives'), and
attract risk-seeking investors ('adverse selection').
Such information failures in financial markets have
been well analysed (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss 1981;
Hoff and Stiglitz 1993). The situation is worsened
by weak legal systems hampering foreclosures and
debt recovery.
Indeed, the evidence is that in a number of coun-
tries banks have been slow to innovate in lending
and have found themselves with excess liquidity5
Rather than thrusting into new markets to serve the
poor, banks have tended to be passive after liberal-
isation. Studies in Bangladesh and the Philippines
suggest that commercial banks retreated from pro-
viding financial services to the poor after liberalisa-
tion, being content to leave that part of the market
to informal agents and NGOs (McGregor 1994;
Agabin 1988). Moreover the spreads between
deposit and lending rates have tended not to be
competed down, or invested in raising service qual-
ity, or meet the higher transaction costs of servicing
the poor. Instead wide spreads seem to cover the
costs of inefficiency and past bad debt (World Bank
1995; Fischer 1993). Much of the problem has to
do with oligopolistic banking sectors in many coun-
tries (Hadjimichael et al. 1995). Thus:
Ghana (Aryeetey 1993; World Bank 1994), Southern
American Cone (Fischer 1993), Indonesia and the
Philippines (Sikorski 1994).
far from suffering the credit gap predicted
under the theory of financial repression, many
African financial systems are marked by a
clubby conservatism and persistent excess liq-
uidity This implies the holding of deposit lia-
bilities over and above statutory requirements.
It also implies a lack of motivation to attract
new deposits and an unwillingness by financial
institutions to mop up liquidity by committing
new loans... High financial liquidity co-exists
with unfunded development needs.
(Wagacha, 1991: 119-20.)
There is now a substantial literature showing that
the formal financial sector is not the only possible
source of financial services for the poor. Financial
markets consist of a range of informal service
providers such as traders, landlords, moneylenders,
friends and relatives, who operate outside the legal
system governing the financial sector. Structuralist
analyses of financial sector development attempt to
incorporate this fact. Though the macroeconomic
conclusions from such analyses are debated (see, for
example, Buffie 1984; Kapur 1992; Cho 1990), the
view that the activities of different segments of
financial markets are linked is most certainly true.
The key question here is whether, overall, consider-
ing both formal and informal agents, the poor are
able to gain better services following liberalisation
of financial markets.
Recently the opinion over informal lenders has been
revised. Whereas previously the informal market
was seen as exploitative of a captured market com-
posed of vulnerable customers, now it is seen as a
competitive market for financial services. Much of
the revision has come from a growing awareness of
the huge variety in informal finance (Adams and
Fitchett 1992), and some is based on a number of
studies suggesting the high interest rates charged by
some informal lenders are due to the high costs of
lending to the poor (Aleem 1990; Chowdhury
1992; Rahman 1992). Studies show that the poor
benefit from informal finance, though less so from
the moneylender variety (Buckley 1997). It is there-
fore important to assess the impact of liberalisation
in general on informal financial services for the
poor, and the pressure on micro-finance institutions
in particular to attain financial sustainability
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Despite the recent warming in development think-
ing towards informal lenders, there are a number of
reasons why intensifying competition in the tradi-
tional markets of some informal lenders remains
important for antipoverty It is doubtful whether the
informal sector actually intermediates in the sense
of mobilising capital from informal savers to infor-
mal borrowers. Christensen (1993) shows that
informal financial arrangements tend to be either
for savings or for lending, and are less engaged in
intermediation (excepting some mutual assistance
groups and savings and credit associations). Many
informal arrangements simply provide safe-keeping
for savers. So in terms of savings facilities, the poor
may be a source of cheap working capital for peo-
ple like traders, sometimes at zero or negative real
interest rates (Bouman 1984).
A large part of informal lending activities are
financed either from formal credit (Rahman 1992;
Germidis et al. 1991), or from the lenders' own
resources (equity lenders). Formal real interest rate
hikes might result in not only increased formal
funds, but also higher informal rates when those
funds are on-lent. Arguably some of those funds are
on-lent in the informal sector only because they are
cheapened in the formal sector through subsidisa-
tion, and so interest rate liberalisation and credit
quota removal may wipe out some of these informal
funds. In other words, some informal on-lenders
may feel a squeeze in their funds. This might result
in reduced rather than increased competition
between informal lenders, giving an advantage to
equity lenders, such as professional moneylenders.
Iqbal (1988) shows that moneylenders do drop
their interest rates in response to increased formal
interventions, and also discriminate between bor-
rowers. Studies have shown that there can be many
types of informal contracts, specifying a variety of
financial terms and conditions, apart from varia-
tions in interest rates, and also perhaps linking
them to vital services in inputs and products mar-
kets (Sinha and Matin 1998; Binswanger and
Rosenzweig 1986). Arguably these suggest scope
for competitive pressure in informal markets since
it is clearly far from being a 'uniform commodity'
market. Informal lenders have 'a broad range of dis-
cretion' which they can use to their advantage
(Yotopoulos and Floro 1991: 162).
Some claim interventions via micro-finance are pos-
sibly changing the social landscape facing the poor.
Rahman and Wahid (1992: 303) claim that '...the
Grameen Bank brought a silent revolution in the
century old patronclient relationship in rural
Bangladesh.' Based on interviews with patrons, they
argue that Grameen Bank intervention decreased
sharecropping, increased agricultural wages,
decreased patrondebtor links, and reduced
patrons' quasi-judiciary powers (under salish). Ray
(1985), Hossain (1984), Yaqub (1995) and Rahman
(1986) suggest similar effects. Micro-finance may
improve the poor's bargaining position with infor-
mal lenders by altering rural power balances and
increasing competition amongst service providers,
and also may make the poor more attractive to
informal lenders through pre-screening, increasing
debt capacity, facilitating savings, and reducing risk
(Sinha and Matin 1998).
Thus micro-finance may be a valuable alternative
savings and credit service for the poor and also a
means to stimulate market competition. Service
provision by semi-formal institutions such as NGO
micro-finance also has the benefit for the poor that
they can be brought under a certain amount of
financial supervision and prudential regulation, as
compared to the informal agents. Subsidies to such
semi-formal institutions may be tolerable if they
provide a competitive advantage in service quality
and terms, so as to cut into informal markets and
stimulate competition. Yet the indiscriminate pres-
sure is for subsidy removal in micro-finance, reduc-
ing competition precisely in segments of the
financial market most relevant to the poor.
Especially since by escaping formal rules (some of
which, like reserve requirements, serve economic
functions), informal service providers are helped in
undercutting formal providers in terms of 'effective
interest rates' (i.e. rates which account for all
explicit and ïmplicit costs and inconveniences)
(Herath 1994, Table 1; Ahmed 1989; Castello,
Stearns and Christen 1991). Subsidies to semi-for-
mal institutions may allow competition against the
advantages of informality In this case the focus
should be to work out ways of providing the least
subsidy, with least adverse impacts on incentives for
the borrowers and the semi-formal institution.
Nevertheless total subsidy removal may be prema-
ture for antipoverty
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5 Conclusions
Strong reliance on market forces is good where it
eliminates anti-poor incentives and biases arising
from excessive financial sector interventions. Much
of the pro-market emphasis in micro-finance poli-
cymaking is in line with a neoclassical account of
financial markets, which calls for laissez faire finan-
cial-sector policies. Empirically this account is
found to be lacking. The theory seems to oversim-
plify the workings of financial sectors in developing
countries. This suggests caution regarding current
thinking on pro-poor finance. This article argues in
particular for restraint in assuming that market lib-
eralisation and financial sustainability of micro-
finance programmes are certain pro-poor strategies.
The reality appears to be more complex, and less
certain. 'Undermining rural development with
cheap credit' (Adams et al. 1984) may be true, but
also, undermining the poor with overly simplified
ideas is likely
If liberalised financial markets do not behave as pre-
dicted, and the poor continue to be under-served,
then an important role exists for micro-finance to
provide poverty-focused finance. In some situations
there may be valuable antipoverty rewards for pro-
viding certain kinds of subsidies to micro-finance.
Not all situations, methods and objectives of pro-
viding subsidy would be successful, but the specific
ones that are should become increasingly better
defined as more detailed research unfolds. For
example, Jam (1996) dispels some earlier naive
assumptions about group-based micro-finance,
highlighting instead the importance of investing in
managerial and organisational strength. Lipton
(1996) argues that subsidising transaction costs and
administration, not interest rates, would be appro-
priate. Given the major financial innovations
already made by some micro-finance programmes,
the strong lesson of micro-finance must surely be
that careful intervention - rather than laissez faire -
is the way to produce new services useful to the
poor. Micro-finance is hardly a triumph of market
reforms. It should be emphasised that not all inter-
ventions are financially repressive, especially those
that deepen the financial sector by including the
poor more, and ït is important to distinguish them
from those that are.
The tendency to incorporate micro-finance into the
market paradigm misses a major contribution of
group-based micro-finance, namely, that it is a
proven example of selfish motives channelled into
co-operative behaviour. Such behaviour helped to
ameliorate some information problems, making col-
lateral-free credit possible (de Aghion 1994; Besley
and Coate 1991). Finding the right institutional
design and incentives system has been a matter of
costly experimentation. The poor were previously
thought unbankable by some, and micro-finance
innovation proved this wrong. The concern here is
whether the pressure to innovate is being replaced
by the pressure to achieve financial sustainability
and adhere to simple pro-market ideas. Such a
turn-around makes one cautious about the empha-
sis on MFIs to tone down their antipoverty agendas.
They are advised to concentrate on the bankable
poor, commonly defined as the not-so-poor' or
'near-poor', i.e. those just around the poverty line,
since others are felt to be unsuitable for micro-
finance. This static view is hard to accept since it
was public investment in the explicit antipoverty
agendas of micro-finance programmes in the first
place that stimulated the development of a financial
technology that now permits more of the poor to be
seen as bankable.
If others of the poor remain outside this technology
then clearly the need for innovation is not over.
Some of the new innovation may arise in finance,
although perhaps not most of it, but the current
complacency towards excluded groups seems
myopic. The leading emphasis should be to con-
tinue to innovate rather than withdraw into the safe
margins of financial sustainability Expecting micro-
finance programmes to achieve rapid financial inde-
pendence, simply because some have the potential
to do so (especially if they concentrate on the not-
so-poor), ignores potential cost-savings in future
innovation and provision of services to the poor.
BAC provides a good example of this, where it has
used its micro-finance related outreach, infrastruc-
ture (such as village level offices), and local knowl-
edge to innovate and develop, in parallel, a widely
acclaimed non-formal primary education service for
the poor (Lovell 1992). NGOs are rightly viewed as
lucrative sources of pro-poor innovation, but their
reliance on justifying donor funds makes them
especially susceptible to the current emphasis on
financial sustainability, rather than to risky
experimentation.
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The myopia is costly also in other terms. Investing
in pro-poor development, if it helps the poor to
make better use of finance, is one way of promoting
financial deepening in developing countries. There
is growing worry that. micro-finance in some places
may have reached some kind of maximum absorp-
tion levels (Quasem 1991; Osmani 1989; Rahman
and Hossain 1988; Abugre 1993). The response has
been to emphasise micro-finance-plus programmes,
where non-financial services such as training are
provided in addition to finance (Gamser 1992). The
hope is to fill some of the 'missing middle-sized'
enterprises as the poor graduate from micro-enter-
prise. Some of the problems probably lie in such
supply-side issues, and helping people to move
from being primarily suppliers of labour (especially
in micro-enterprise) towards being suppliers more
of capital and management is a major task. The goal
of financial sustainability may tempt some micro-
finance providers to tone down, in quantity and/or
quality non-financial services, at least the sub-
sidised ones. The effort to research into new non-
financial services for the poor may also be
undersupplied, for the same reason. But part of the
problem may not be supply-side at all. Aggregate
demand downshifts may stifle micro-enterprise
(Cooper 1990); so may the distribution of that
demand between different income groups because
of their different consumption patterns, as sug-
gested by Dawson (1994) in Nigeria under struc-
tural adjustment. This would require intensifying
efforts towards poverty reduction and income
equalïty so as to raise consumption within the mar-
kets which micro-enterprises serve.
Well proven micro-finance programmes such as
Grameen Bank are the ones most under pressure for
financial sustainability. They are also the ones with
the better record of reaching their target population
most consistently In these programmes, therefore,
micro-finance represents a fairly well-targeted
transfer, and yet also creates incentives for the poor
to increase their economic activity It is not perfect,
but compared to other approaches to providing
transfers to the poor, micro-finance appears to be
doing very well. Given that donors and govern-
ments wish to make rapid cuts in consumption
poverty supporting private consumption through
the implicit subsidies of well-targeted micro-finance
programmes appears to be advantageous. Put
another way, where it has worked, micro-finance
offers a way for taxpayers (mainly in rich countries)
to be charitable to some of the poor (even if not the
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